Center for Democracy and Human Rights in Saudi Arabia, CDHR, Washington DC

May 7, 2015

King Salman’s Power Consolidation, Dangerous Foreign Adventures and Liberating Social Media

CDHR’s Commentaries and Analysis

Saudi Invasion of Yemen: A Perilous Blunder 

CDHR’s Analysis: Invading and inflicting enduring devastation on their perceived domestic opponents and external enemies are not new to the monocratic and theocratic Saudi rulers. Long before and since the establishment of their kingdom in 1932, the Saudi/Wahhabi allies have invaded and engaged in gory wars against other tribes and people of different religious orientations throughout the vast desert of the Arabian Peninsula and beyond.

The grisly Saudi/Wahhabi movement is based on their interpretation of Islam, which means that anyone who does not fit into what they decide to be the correct Islam is a deviant (Thal), consequently, a legitimate target of redemption/cleansing by force. This practice includes all adherents of all brands and sects of the Muslim faith, which was established and practiced more than 1,000 years before the Saudi/Wahhabi dogma, Wahhabism, was contrived in 1744.

Two years after the establishment of the Saudi/Wahhabi state in 1932, the Saudi monarchy expanded its territorial acquisition southward into what was Yemeni territory at that time. They employed the same violent methods they used to subjugate the multitude of tribes they invaded and conquered between 1774 and 1932.  The Yemenis resisted the Saudi advances, but were defeated by the Saudi/Wahhabi zealots in 1934.

After the war, the Yemenis signed an agreement with the Saudis, known as the 1934 Taif Treaty, which was understood to mean that the Saudis would retain the agriculturally fertile Asir and Najran regions, while the Yemenis would have free border access to visit and trade with their former compatriots who resided in the captured territories. There was no legally established border between the Saudi and Yemeni territories except in the “westernmost part of the border, adjacent to the Red Sea, and in the process several ethnically Yemeni areas became Saudi territory.” 

Numerous subsequent attempts were made to settle the contested Saudi-Yemeni borders, including the signing of the “Jeddah border agreement in 2000, whereby Yemen eventually conceded the decades-long disputed provinces of Asir, Najran, and Jizan.” However, in 2012, the names of the Yemeni officials who negotiated and signed onto the agreement were found to be recipients of Saudi largess. This led to questioning of the legality of the 2000 agreement, many Yemenis arguing that not only the 2000, but the 1934 agreements are null and void.

Despite failed border agreements, the 1,100 mile long Saudi-Yemeni border was relatively peaceful and mostly respected by both parties from 1934 until 1962. During that period, Yemen was ruled by Zaidi Kings Yahya and Ahmed. The majority of the Zaidis (an offshoot of Shi’a Islam) resides in a large area along the Yemeni side of the border.

In 1962, the Yemeni military overthrew the Zaidi monarchy, inspired by Arab nationalism spearheaded by Nasser of Egypt who was dedicated to the overthrow of all Arab monarchies, especially the Saudis, whom he accused of being “puppets” of Western colonialism and imperialism. When pro-monarchy Yemenis resisted the military takeover, Nasser dispatched Egyptian forces to ensure the success of the coup. Alarmed by Nasser’s involvement in Yemen, the Saudi royals invited and opened their borders to the Yemeni royalists whom they housed, fed, armed, trained and sent back across the border to fight the Egyptian-supported republican Yemeni government.

When the Saudis and the royalists failed to restore the deposed Zaidi King, most of the Zaidis went back to their home region (Saadah) along the Saudi border. They were subsequently marginalized by the Yemeni central government for decades until they started fighting for their rights in the 1990s.

Between 1962 and 2004, the Zaidis (aka Houthis, named after their leader, Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi) who had ruled Yemen for 1000 years, were used by the Saudis and by the Yemeni central government to advance their separate territorial and political interests and influence. However, the Houthis began their fight to restore their political and economic rights in 2004 by attacking the central government of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, in whose downfall in 2012 the Saudis and the Houthis played major roles, although for different reasons. The Saudi rulers wanted to install a Yemeni government they could control while the Houthis wanted to rule, a daunting outcome the Saudis dread.

When the Saudis realized that the ruthless Houthis (apparently with Iranian help) were gaining the upper hand in the bloody Yemeni conflict, they decided to invade Yemen in the hope of weakening the Houthis and imposing a settlement that will ensure uncontested Saudi influence over Yemeni domestic politics and external policies and affiliations. The Saudi rulers assembled a horde of Arab and Muslim autocratic regimes to participate in a massive air campaign against the Houthis, who by now have conquered most of Yemen and expelled its President who resides in Saudi Arabia now and probably for years to come.

On March 26, 2015, the Saudi oligarchy and like-minded (hired) Arab regimes amassed a deadly fleet of modern aircraft (185 jetfighters-Yemen does not have an air force to speak of) and began a devastating bombardment of Yemen, supposedly to destroy the Houthi’s military and political gains and to restore Yemen’s “legitimate” president. Four weeks into the unwinnable war, the Saudi rulers realized that they may have committed a colossal mistake as evidenced by their failure to impede the Houthis’ advances. Faced with rapidly ebbing enthusiasm among the members of the “hired” coalition, growing global scorn, pressure from the US, fear of confrontation with Iran and/or its proxies, anxiety over domestic unrest and internal royal conflict, the Saudi rulers congratulated each other, praised the king for winning the war and declared “mission accomplished.” However, they continued the bombardment to save face or in hopes of salvaging some gains from the fiasco. This might be delusional given “… the endemic hostility of the ordinary Yemeni and his traditional contempt for Saudis.”

Despite the Saudis’ self-congratulatory declarations, reality on the ground contradicts their assertions. The Houthi advances continue unabated, restoring the deposed (“legitimate”) Yemeni president is unlikely, Yemeni unity and security are shattered, more than 1,000 Yemenis have been killed, an additional 4,000 wounded, 150,000 families displaced, and 7. 5 million other Yemenis have been negatively affected by the Saudi blitzkrieg and by shortages of food and medical supplies  due to Saudis’ sea blockade. 

Given this ghastly outcome, the Saudis may have bought some time by weakening the Houthis’ and their allies’ war capabilities, heightening divisions within Yemeni society and prolonging the struggle among different power-seeking groups. In the long run, however, invading and inflicting death and destruction in Yemen will not only increase animosity toward the Saudis among all Yemenis, but could tilt the balance in favor of those who advocate tolerance, a rational approach to problem solving and popular participation in governance.

On the other hand, the Saudi-coordinated and-led war in Yemen could strengthen terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda and ISIS and embolden the Muslim Brotherhood, all of whom are dedicated to the overthrow of the Saudi monarchy. 

Saudi Women’s and Human Rights Advocates’ Trepidation Is Justified

As predicted in this commentary which was written immediately after King Salman’s ascension to the throne in January 2015, his actions thus far have confirmed our misgivings as we explained in the next commentary.

CDHR’s Commentary: While it may be a little premature to predict what King Salman’s agenda for Saudi Arabia might be, given his religious affiliations and bleak record regarding women’s rights and his staunch opposition to power-sharing and democratic reforms, it is safe to assume that women’s rights, religious tolerance, the advancement of human rights, civil society, codified rule of law and public participation in the decision-making processes will not shine under his watch. He and his Sudairi wing of the incredibly power-drugged princes (known as the Sudairi Seven) still believe, act and behave as if the country is their private property. In July, 2013, a defecting Prince, Khalid Al-Farhan Al-Saud professed that “Those holding power in the kingdom do believe that they own the state: Land and people. They insist to run the cou ntry with this belief despite political awareness of the people and repeated calls for justice and freedom.”

To remind the Saudi people of his family’s claim to the ownership of the country, after inheriting the throne in January 2015, King Salman summoned his new appointees to swear the oath of allegiance to him in the exact location (Diriyah) where the Saudi/Wahhabi alliance was formed in 1744. Since then, he has been receiving other visiting Gulf royals, European and the US Secretary of State, John Kerry, in Dir-e-yah to show and explain to them the history of the Saudi family’s first capital with which he has been obsessed and on which he has been spending millions of dollars of public revenues to restore dozens of its mud buildings to look like they did more than two and half centuries ago.

Given his unwavering belief in his family’s ownership of the country, King Salman is unlikely to consider, let alone implement, any political reform measures that might imply public co-ownership of the country. Additionally, King Salman is committed to the strengthening of and adherence to the globally reviled Wahhabi/ Salafi dogma as exemplified by his close ties with and support for the zealous Saudi religious establishment and extensive connections with global zealot groups.

It’s not surprising that Saudi citizens, especially women, are apprehensive about their fate under Salman’s rule. As one Saudi woman stated, ‘His brother {King Abdullah} opened the road and now he will close it,’ she declared and went on to explain, ‘We know he is closer to the religious people than Abdullah was.’ Her and other Saudi reformers’ fear of King Salman and his Sudairi relatives’ unequivocal opposition to political reforms is justified. Their apprehension and resentment are shared by some of the ruling princes who have been critical of Salman and his wing of the family’s unflinching resistance to sharing power with other wi ngs of the ruling family. Prince Talal, a long time promoter of “social contract” between the monarchy and its subjects, accused the Sudairi supremacist, “Here, the family is the master and the ruler.”

During his 60 year tenure as the governor of the Saudi capital, Riyadh, King Salman expanded and modernized the desert city’s infrastructure, but did very little to prepare its population to embrace modernity and its complex scientific and technological demands. He did not initiate scientific or liberal arts schools. He expanded and strengthened extremist educational institutions such as Imam Mohammed Ibn Saud University, which is known for graduating hardcore Imams and recruits for Al-Qaeda. He never hired and promoted any woman to an executive position. He had an opportunity to show Saudi women that their suspicion of his anti-women attitude and practice is unfounded, but he did not. He could have appointed at least a woman among his new appointees when inherited the throne in January, but he did not.

Like his late full brothers, former Interior Minister Naif and Defense Minister Sultan, King Salman is a staunch supporter of the ferocious religious police whose job is to ensure women’s head- to-toe coverings, gender segregation, enforcement of prayer five times a day and to arrest, interrogate and imprison anyone they consider uncompliant with the repressive and medieval social mores they create and enforce.

One can only hope that King Salman and his administration will realize that the new generation of Saudi women is very different from their mothers and grandmothers. They are educated, very well-informed and irrepressible. Empowering Saudi women voluntarily can only strengthen, stabilize and propel the socially and politically lagging society into a peaceful, just, tolerant, unified and participatory polity.

King Salman’s Consolidation of Power Is Neither Surprising Nor Unexpected  

CDHR’s Analysis: Many Saudis, royals and commoners, knew that King Salman’s ascendance to the throne would not be peaceful, reconciliatory, reform oriented or open to ideas, suggestions or advice. This is based on his record of staunch belief in the supremacy of the people of Nejd (birth place of his ancestors and their violent rise to power), his opposition to political reforms, his support for the lethal revisionist Wahhabi dogma, his close ties to the domestic zealot establishment and his association with extremists worldwide. 

Domestically, King Salman is known for having zero tolerance for any dissension or for people (commoners or royals) who advocate any change in the old order: his autocratic family’s birth right to own and rule the country as if it were a private family enterprise. This is why his dismissal of powerful princes did not come as an unexpected undertaking to those inside the country who know him best, but fear his reprisal if they dare describe him as what he is, an absolute opponent of political pluralism now   and forever.

Contrary to King Salman’s claim that he sacked his half-brother, Crown Prince Migrin and his nephew, Foreign Minister Saud Al-Faisal and replaced them with like-minded and obedient princes, his son Mohammed and his dreaded nephew, Mohammed Bin Naif and a “yes-man” commoner, Adel Al-Jubair, because of his burning desire to place the most fit men in top positions to run the county’s business, in reality his objectives were deeper and more ominous.  Salman’s real objective is to ensure the eternal perpetuation of his family’s rule, specifically his Sudairi­ wing of the family.

In order to guarantee that political reform and democratization do not occur during his reign and long after he is gone, King Salman installed a younger generation of the Sudairis in top governmental posts, apparently confident that they will continue their elders’ autocratic rule.

King Salman’s claim that he placed the best and most qualified people in charge of the country’s affairs did not convince many Saudis. They know that Salman has and will always put the royal family’s interest before and above the well-being of the population.

If King Salman’s performance and initiatives thus far are indicative of what his domestic agenda will be, it’s safe to assume that he will re-entrench his family’s “birth right” ownership of the country. For example, he is slowly transitioning the seat of power from the current capital Riyadh to Diriyah, the original capital of the Saudi/Wahhabi alliance (1744), whose restoration is King Salman’s ‘…first personal dedication of any project since assuming the throne,’ according to his son Prince Sultan.

In his first speech when he inherited the throne in January 2015, King Salman further hinted at his intention of returning to the ruling methods of the founders of the state, including his father, King Abdulaziz. He praised the latter for his vision and policies to which Salman attributed the country’s subsequent unity, prosperity and stability. Given Salman’s history, this implies that he will rely on intimidation, intolerance and use of sheer force to rule the country in the same manner his father did.

Anticipating Salman’s projected ruling methods, many Saudis express pessimism and fear via communication in person, print, audio or visual media. The hopeful expectations of reform, albeit cosmetic, during King Abdullah’s reign seem to have been replaced by pessimism domestically and by apprehension about King Salman’s regional policies, such as the ill-advised costly invasion of Yemen.

Public pessimism is shared by the few liberal leaning and empathetic male and female royals who had vocalized measured support for minimum individual rights, as they did during King Abdullah’s era. They rightfully fear being locked up in Salman’s private prison or worse for voicing opinions in favor of any reform.

Admittedly, King Salman inherited the throne at a time when his family and kingdom are facing the most challenging threats in their history. Rather than navigating a path that might spare the country a violent cataclysm, as exemplified by the consuming turmoil plaguing the Arab World, King Salman has chosen to turn backward hoping to avoid the inevitable.  

Transformational Process Through Social Media

CDHR’s Comment: The social media is slowly transforming the Arab peoples’ perceptions of themselves, the root causes of their stagnation and of the world around them. The most evident revolutionary example of this reality is the unprecedented promising dialogue between young Arabs and their counterparts in Israel, a country most Arabs (including this one) are raised to fear and hate.  For many centuries, the Arab autocracies and theocracies contrived external enemies and stoked rejection of the mighty, transformative Western technological inventions and democratic values as eloquently illustrated in “What Went Wron g” by Professor Bernard Lewis. In order to divert their disenfranchised populations’ attention from their homegrown political, social, educational, scientific and political stagnation, the Arab regimes blame others, including colonialism, traditions, the West and religion for impeding progress in the Arab World.

However, there are no sources that are more blamed than the United States and Israel. “The grotesquely failed societies of the Middle East desperately need Israel and the US to blame for their self-wrought problems. Neither Washington nor Tel Aviv and Jerusalem are responsible for the Arab world’s pervasive corruption, stagnation, oppression of women and lack of creativity or a work ethic.” Linking the blame on Israel and the US occurs despite the fact that the US’s and Israel’s interests in the Middle East rarely coincide.

Nowhere in the Arab World does one hear or read more condemnation of Israel and the US (for different reasons) than among the regimes and populations of the Gulf Arab states, the West’s close allies and business partners. However, many Arabs have known, but rarely say publically (due to fear of severe reprisals by their governments and socieites), that neither the US nor Israel are the root causes of their societies’ ills. Many Arabs, especially the social media generation, are discovering that their autocratic and theocratic ruling elites and their antiquated institutions are the enemies of progress, equality, freedom of expression, women’s and minorities’ rights and freedom of choice. 

Given this burgeoning awareness, the Arab masses, especially in the Gulf region, are realising that no one is more responsible for their lack of social, political and scientific development and progress than their autocratic and theocratic rulers. The Center for Democracy and Human Rights in Saudi Arabia (CDHR) and others have been highlighting these facts for years and thanks to the social media, many Saudis and other Arabs (male and female) are realizing that their retarded progress is home-conceived, hatched and nurtured.

As exemplified by this article, media savvy and pro-democracy Arabs, especially youth (women and men) are more forward-looking people than past generations. These young people and other pro-democracy advocates, such as those who gave their lives in the Arab Spring to rid their socieites of iron-fisted dictators, are the best hope for transforming and propelling Arab societies into a more democratic, tolerant and peaceful future.

For the sake of the people of the Middle East, world peace and stability and for the national security of democratic societies, the West should be focusing on supporting freedom-yearning Middle Easterners instead of continuing to appease and protect ruling elites whose survival depends on marginalizing and oppressing their peoples.

Your contributions to CDHR’s efforts to address tough issues, invoke thought-provoking discourse and suggest peaceful solutions are crucial. We need to continue our educational outreach worldwide. CDHR is a 501 (c) 3 tax exempt educational organization.

Please go to our website www.cdhr.info and click on donate.

Or send checks to this address:

Center for Democracy and Human Rights in Saudi Arabia, CDHR

1050 17 St. NW, Suite 1000,

Washington, DC 20036